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Recent studies of attacks on complex networks suggest that small initial breakdowns can lead to
global cascades of overload failures in communication, economic trading, and supply-transportation
systems, considering the defense methods is very important to reduce the huge damage. The propa-
gation of failures depends on the flow dynamics such as packet routing of physical quantities and on
the heterogeneous distribution of load or capacity in many realistic networks which have topological
properties of scale-free (SF) and degree-degree correlations. We introduce a defense strategy based
on emergent rewirings between neighbors of the attacked node, and investigate the size of cascade
on SF networks with controllable correlations. We show the differences of damaged size for the types
of correlations and the effective range of tolerance in the defense methods. They can be performed
on the current wireless communication or dynamic allocation technologies.
PACS numbers: 89.20.Hh, 89.75.-k, 05.10.-a
Cascades of overload failures triggered by small initial
failures or attacks are sometimes occurred and propa-
gated to very large damage in real networks such as power
grid (blackout), Internet (packet congestion or server
down by DoS), economic trading (bankruptcy), traffic
system (jamming), and so forth. This phenomenon is
more severe than the disconnecting of networks by inten-
tional attacks [1], because a physical quantity (hereafter
called packet) can not be transmitted even through the
connection if one of the terminal nodes exceeds its load
capacity. In other words, not only the topological struc-
ture of network but also the heterogeneously distributed
load or capacity is deeply related to the intrinsic dynam-
ics of packet flow and to the size of cascade as the con-
sequence of propagation of overload failures.
As an important topological structure, we have found
scale-free (SF) property in many complex networks [2].
The highly heterogeneous degree distribution follows a
power law P (k) ∼ k−γ , 2 < γ < 3. Moreover, recent
studies classify SF networks according to types of degree-
degree correlations of nodes with their neighbors [3]; so-
cial networks tend to have assortative connections be-
tween peers with similar degrees [4, 5], while technologi-
cal or biological networks tend to have disassortative ones
between those nodes with high degrees, namely hubs, and
those with low degrees [3, 6]. The effect of correlations on
cascades of overload failures is not yet studied, although
a number of important aspects of cascading failures in
complex networks have been discussed [7, 8, 9, 10]; in
particular a simple model of cascades of overload fail-
ures has been introduced [11] with a proposal of defense
strategy based on intentional removals (IR) [12]. The
numerical results have shown to reduce the size of cas-
cade by the IR on a sacrifice of the removing a fraction
of nodes that mainly contribute to generate load rather
than to transmit the packets.
We investigate the cascading failures on SF networks
with degree-degree correlations, and propose an alterna-
tive defense strategy based on emergent rewiring which
is realized in distributed manner with additional cost in
the neighbors of the initial attack. On the current tech-
nologies, our proposed methods are basically applicable
to wireless communications, airline flights, logistic net-
works, and so on in the practically important service do-
mains.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We first
describe the basic process of cascading failures, and con-
sider the defense strategies. Then, we introduce SF net-
work models whose types of correlations are controllable.
Through numerical simulations, we show the differences
of damaged size for the types of correlations and the effect
of our proposed defense strategy. Finally, we summarize
these results.
For a given (undirected) network, we assume that at
each time step a request of communication is generated
between every pair of nodes (i, j) and a packet is trans-
mitted along the shortest paths connecting nodes i and
j. If there is more than one shortest paths connecting
two given nodes, the packet is divided evenly at each
branching point. In this situation, it is natural that the
load Lk(t) of node k at time t is defined through the be-
tweenness centrality Bk(t): the total amount of packets
passing through the node per unit of time. Note that
the shortest paths may be changed by the propagation
of failures. Also as in Ref [11, 12], the capacity Ck of
node k is assumed to be proportional to its initial load,
Ck
def
= αLk(0), k = 1, 2, . . . , N, (1)
where α ≥ 1 is the tolerance parameter, and N is the
initial number of nodes. From α ≥ 1, no node is over-
load in the initial network. After an initial attack, the
damaged node is disconnected. Then, some nodes re-
ceive much loads that exceed own capacities by changing
paths, and the corresponding nodes with overload col-
lapse. These removals lead to the next redistribution of
load among the remaining nodes in the network, and the
subsequent overload may occur: the failures are propa-
gated. The cascading process is stop at T with size N ′
2only when the updated load satisfies Lk(T ) ≤ Ck for all
the nodes k. The damage caused by a cascade is quanti-
fied in terms of the relative size of the largest connected
component GC = N ′/N . As the minimum origin, we fo-
cus on load-based intentional attack upon an exhausted
node which has the highest load, since global cascade can
be triggered by removing only the key node [11].
In addition to the defense strategy based on IR [12],
we introduce an alternative strategy based on emergent
pair-connections (EP) and emergent ring (ER). The n
connections from the initially attacked node are replaced
by the rewirings between the neighbors as shown in Fig.
1. Each of these strategies is performed after the initial
attack before the propagation.
IR: The fraction f of nodes with smallest ∆i
def
= Li(0)−
Lgi are removed to avoid the generation of pack-
ets from the peripheral nodes, where the total load
generated by node i is
Lgi
def
=
∑
j
(Dij + 1) = (D¯i + 1)(N − 1), (2)
D¯i =
∑
j Dij/N , Dij is the shortest path length
between nodes i and j.
EP: In the neighbors of the initial attack, pairs of nodes
are linked according to the decreasing order of
Wij
def
= Ci/ki + Cj/kj, (3)
where ki and kj denotes the degrees of nodes i and
j. Large Ci/ki corresponding to large Bi(0) and
small ki means that the node i is a bridge node
between subgraphs and that important to construct
bypass routes.
ER: In the neighbors, a ring is rewired according to the
decreasing order of Ci/ki as shown in Fig. 1 (right).
The variations of IR for selecting removed nodes have al-
most the same effect [12] because the quantities of small-
est closeness centrality, load, and degree have correlations
to smallest ∆i. Similar modifications of EP and ER are
also possible as mentioned latter. Here we should remark
that the conventional IR is cost-less, but needs the global
information to chose the nodes with smallest ∆i in the
network; while our proposed EP and ER modify local
connections by using the capacities and degrees of the
neighbors within only two steps, but not cost-less.
Next, we consider SF networks with various types of
degree-degree correlations. Unfortunately, we have no
general approach to construct SF networks with a given
correlations such as the configuration method [13] of ran-
dom networks for a given degree distribution, in addi-
tion there are only a few models to be able to control
the correlations between assortative (Ass) and disassor-
tative (Dis) networks. Thus, we consider the following
two models. The procedures are repeated until the net-
work reaches to the required size N .
CDD: coupled duplication-divergence model [14]
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FIG. 1: Defense strategy based on emergent rewirings. The
red circle and dashed lines are the initially attacked node
and the removed connections, respectively. Blue lines are the
rewirings between the neighbors. The number in each circle
denotes the order of Ci/ki.
1. At each time step, a new node i′ is added.
2. Simultaneously, a node i is randomly chosen, and
new connections between all the neighbors j of i
and the new node i′ are duplicated.
3. With probability qv, a connection between i and i
′
is established (self-interaction).
4. In the divergence process, each duplicated connec-
tion is removed with probability 1− qe.
These local rules are biologically plausible [15] and also
suitable for distributed systems. Note that larger qv
enhances the assortativity of network generated by the
above rules because the self-interaction means connect-
ing a pair of nodes with similar degrees. In other words,
qv is a control parameter of the correlation. However,
the number of total connections may vary because of the
duplication processes. Obviously, a network with many
bypass routes as the consequence of many connections
becomes more tolerant to failures or attacks. Thus, to
match the condition, we confirm the variance is bounded
in the self-averaging [16]
χ
def
=
√
〈k2〉 − 〈k〉2
〈k〉
< 0.2, (4)
for the set of parameters in Table I. The randomly gen-
erated CDD networks have 〈k〉 ≈ 4.
LPA: shifted linear preferential attachment model [17]
1. At each time step, a new node is added and linked
to old nodes by m new connections.
2. The attached nodes are randomly chosen by the
shifted linear preference [17, 18]: a node with de-
gree k is chosen as the terminal of a new connection
with probability proportional to k + w.
3This is a modification of the BA model [19] including it
at w = 0 as uncorrelated networks (Unc) with 〈k〉 = 2m.
We set the parameter w as in Table I andm = 2 to satisfy
|w| < kmin = m, where kmin denotes the minimum de-
gree. The assortativity r in Ref. [6] is calculated for each
type of correlations. Figs. 2(a)(b) show the degree distri-
butions follow power laws with slightly collapsed parts;
CDD restricts very low degrees because of the duplica-
tion process, and LPA with Dis have a star-like structure
with a few hubs of very large degrees. The insets show
the three types of correlations: Ass with a positive slope,
Unc as almost flat, and Dis with a negative slope.
CDD LPA assortativity
Type qv qe w r
Ass 1.0 0.26 0.19
Unc 0.5 0.35 0.02
Dis 0.0 0.42 -0.29
Weak Ass 1.8 -0.01
Unc 0.0 -0.08
Dis -1.8 -0.49
TABLE I: A set of parameters for CDD and LPA. The types
of correlations Ass, Unc, and Dis denotes assortative, uncorre-
lated, and disassortative networks, respectively. Unnecessary
parameters are blanked. The assortativity r is measured over
the 100 realizations of each network model with N = 1, 000
and 〈k〉 ≈ 4.
In this setting, we numerically investigate the size of
cascades and the effect of defense strategies IR, EP, and
ER for the SF networks. Since the removal of the most
central nodes can trigger global cascades into a drasti-
cally reduced size, the defense strategies are based on
the conventional IR: the restriction of load generation by
removing a fraction f of nodes with most negative ∆i,
and on the proposed EP and ER: emergent rewiring to
compensate the bypass between bridge nodes with large
Ci/ki (with relatively high centrality).
Figs. 3 show the ratio GC as a function of the tol-
erance parameter α for CDD. The parts of dashed lines
above the red line for no defense (NO) show that the cor-
responding strategies are effective. We first compare the
effect in the types of correlations, and then discuss the
difference in the defense strategies. The damage caused
by the intrinsic cascades with NO is larger as the corre-
lation is Ass as shown in Fig. 3(a) rather than Dis as
shown in Fig. 3(c). For the damage, the IR with the
nearly best fraction f = 0.1 or 0.2 [12] remains a larger
GC for Dis, while there is no such difference for the types
of correlations in the EP and ER. For the tolerance pa-
rameter, the effective range is contrast: small α < 1.5 in
the IR, however large α > 1.5 in the EP and ER. It is
common for all types of correlations. In particular, the
size GC in the IR are strongly saturated for increasing
α, while that in the EP or ER is significantly larger. For
example, Fig. 3(a) shows the ratio GC is nearly 0.4 in
the IR (or NO), while it is improved to 0.6 ∼ 0.8 in the
EP or ER at α = 1.5.
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FIG. 2: Degree distributions P (k) and degree-degree correla-
tions 〈kNN 〉 in the inset for (a) CDD and (b) LPA. The blue,
green, and red marks correspond to Ass, Unc, and Dis at the
set of parameters in Table I. They are the averages over 100
realizations.
Figs. 4 show the ratio GC as a function of the tolerance
parameter α for LPA. In contrast to the results for CDD,
the damage with NO is larger as the correlation is Dis
as shown in Fig. 4(c) rather than Ass as shown in Fig.
4(a). In particular, it is annihilative for small α < 1.2.
Thus, LPA is very vulnerable, we have demonstrated [20]
there is no effect in the modified EP and ER by applying
load or degree instead of Ci/ki. For the damage, the
IR remains a larger GC for Ass (but almost no effect
by the saturation in α > 1.6). While the ER (marked
by diamond) reduces the damage for Ass and Unc, the
EP (marked by rectangle) do for Dis in all the range
1 ≤ α ≤ 2. On the other hand, as similar to the results
for CDD, the IR is effective in small α < 1.3, but the EP
or ER is in large α > 1.4.
In summary, we have investigated the cascades of over-
load failures triggered from a load-based attack in SF
networks. Such phenomena is widely observed in so-
cial and technological SF networks with degree-degree
correlations. We have shown that the size of cascades
can be reduced by our defense strategy based on emer-
gent rewirings between bridge nodes with large Ci/ki,
and that the effect is slightly different for the types of
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FIG. 3: Ratio GC as a function of the tolerance parameter α
for CDD with (a) Ass, (b) Unc, and (c) Dis. The solid red
line marked by asterisk corresponds to NO: no defense. The
dashed green lines correspond to the conventional IR with
f = 0.1 (plus) and f = 0.2 (cross). The dashed blue lines
correspond to EP (rectangle) and ER (diamond). They are
the averages over 100 realizations.
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FIG. 4: Ratio GC as a function of the tolerance parameter α
for LPA with (a) Ass, (b) Unc, and (c) Dis. The lines and
marks correspond to the same as the previous. They are the
averages over 100 realizations.
5correlations. With the tolerance parameter α, they are
more complicated: the conventional IR works better in
tight capacity (α < 1.5 for CDD with Dis and for LPA),
but the proposed EP or ER do in reasonable capacity
(α > 1.5 for CDD with Ass and LPA with Dis). We
have confirmed similar results [21] for the capacity in the
other SF network models based on the connecting near-
est neighbors [14] and on the triangulation [22]. Thus,
rewiring is not always best, however the effect is remark-
able in the reasonable capacity. The ad hoc rewirings will
be useful for protecting and sustaining our social organi-
zations or communication infrastructures in real systems
from huge damage triggered by small attacks against the
vulnerable parts.
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